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Most discussions of the digital divide treat it as a 
“North-South” issue, but the conventional dichotomy 
doesn’t apply to cell phones in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Although almost all Sub-Saharan countries are poor by 
international standards, they exhibit great disparities in 
coverage by cell telephone systems.  
   Buys, Dasgupta, Thomas and Wheeler investigate 
the determinants of these disparities with a spatially-
disaggregated model that employs locational information 
for cell-phone towers across over 990,000 4.6-km 
grid squares in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Using probit 
techniques, a probability model with adjustments for 
spatial autocorrelation has been estimated that relates the 
likelihood of cell-tower location within a grid square to 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to identify effective policies for narrowing the digital divide. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at sdasgupta@worldbank.
org.  
potential market size (proximate population); installation 
and maintenance cost factors related to accessibility 
(elevation, slope, distance from a main road, distance 
from the nearest large city); and national competition 
policy. Probit estimates indicate strong, significant results 
for the supply-demand variables, and very strong results 
for the competition policy index.  
   Simulations based on the econometric results suggest 
that a generalized improvement in competition policy to 
a level that currently characterizes the best-performing 
states in Sub-Saharan Africa could lead to huge 
improvements in cell-phone area coverage for many states 
currently with poor policy performance, and an overall 
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Most discussions of the digital divide treat it as a “North-South” issue, but the conventional 
dichotomy doesn’t apply to cell phones in Sub-Saharan Africa.  As Table 1 shows, huge gaps in 
cell phone coverage divide Sub-Saharan countries that are all poor by international standards.  The 
table provides statistics on country-level percentages of urban and rural populations within range 
of cell phone towers.
1  In both rural and urban sectors, population coverage in March, 2004 varied 
from 0 to 100%.  Rural coverage was negligible or nonexistent in 17 countries
2, but above 47% in 
the top quartile.  Urban coverage was below 56% in the lowest quartile, but above 98% in the top 
quartile. 
In this paper, we investigate the sources of these huge disparities in African cell-phone 
coverage, with a particular focus on the role of differences in competition policy.  Moving beyond 
cross-sectional analysis of country-level differences, we take a spatially-disaggregated approach 
that enables us to investigate the local determinants of coverage at thousands of grid points in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  This approach has several advantages.  First, it enables us to control much more 
precisely for area-specific demand and supply factors that affect firms’ decisions to install cell-
phone towers.  These include proximity to main roads and local population centers, as well as local 
topography.  Such factors are potentially-important determinants of cross-country differences in 
coverage, because African countries differ greatly in geography, population distributions and 
infrastructure endowments.  Second, introduction of better spatial controls permits clearer tests of 
the impact of competition policy on cell-tower expansion.  Finally, the micro-spatial approach 
                                                 
1  We have produced the estimates by overlaying a digital map of GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) 
cell phone towers and coverage areas with a map of urban and rural populations.  Cell phone tower data in GIS format 
have been provided by GSM World, Inc.  Spatial population distribution data have been drawn from CIESEN’s 
Gridded Population of the World, version 3. 
2  Djibouti, Angola, Congo, Comoros, Somalia, Guinea, Guinea, Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali, Eritrea, 
Niger, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Chad, Ethiopia and Liberia. 
  2enables us to project the impacts of policy reforms geographically.  We can literally map projected 
new locations of cell phone towers, overlay them with population maps, and directly estimate the 
implications for rural and urban cell phone coverage.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we introduce and discuss 
previous empirical work on the determinants of cell-phone expansion.  Section 3 provides an 
overview of regulatory reform and cell-phone expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Section 4 
motivates our modeling exercise and describes our spatial database.  In Section 5, we develop 
alternative estimation strategies to deal with spatial autocorrelation and present our econometric 
results.  Using these results, Section 6 simulates the country-by-country effect of policy reforms 
that would increase competitiveness to current top-tier levels in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Section 7 
provides a summary and conclusions.   
2.  Previous Research on Cell Phone Diffusion in Developing Countries 
2.1 General Determinants of Cell Phone Diffusion 
Numerous econometric studies have investigated cross-country cell phone penetration rates, 
using a variety of independent variables:  geographic factors and income (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003); 
income alone (Rouvinen, 2004); socio-cultural attributes and internet/telecom use (Kamssu, 2005); 
and national industry structure, pricing schemes and availability of cell-phone features (Kshetri 
and Cheung, 2002; Minges, 1999; Yan and Thong, 2003).  Some studies have used country 
typologies to segment cross-country analyses, rather than imposing a single global coverage model 
(Banerjee and Ros, 2004; Dholakia, Dholakia, Lehrer, and Kshetri, 2004; Dholakia and Kshetri, 
2002).  Others have investigated the complementarity between cell phone diffusion and the 
presence of other communications technologies (Hamilton, 2003; Wauschkuhn, 2001).  More 
technology-specific studies have looked at the effect of properly calibrating the connection of 
  3mobile and fixed systems (Srivastava and Sinha, 2001; Yan, 2001) and international connections 
(Newman, 1993).   
None of the previously-noted econometric studies explicitly introduces relative rates of 
return to investigate the microeconomics of cell-phone adoption by businesses.  Evidence on rates 
of return has been gathered in a survey exercise by Samuel, et al. (2005).  Another relevant study 
takes a detailed look at the determinants of cell-phone banking use in South Africa (Irwin, 
Zaheeda, Douglas, and Shaun, 2003).   
2.2  The Role of Policy and Industry Structure 
Regulatory policy and industry structure have played a prominent role in many cell-phone 
diffusion analyses, which consider the impacts of regimes ranging from full competition to single-
provider state-run companies on levels of mobile penetration and/or prices and service quality 
(Frempong and Atubra, 2001; Gebreab, 2002; Mureithi,2003; Stovring, 2004; Varoudakis and 
Rossotto, 2004; Wheeler, Dasgupta, and Lall, 2001; Ibarguen, 2003; Wallsten, 2001).  These 
studies generally conclude that privatization and more vigorous competition lead to better overall 
outcomes.  
Other researchers have argued that liberalization and privatization are insufficient to ensure 
broad coverage in rural areas (Bhuiyan, 2004; Harwit, 1998; Mutula, 2002; Panos, 2004).  
Courtright (2004) asserts that development institutions like the World Bank need to account for 
local socio-cultural and institutional conditions when designing rural connectivity programs.  
Specific intervention programs that have been studied include universal service funds (Dhawan, 
Dorian, Gupta, and Sunkara, 2001); community phone shops with shared access (Barendse, 2004; 
Reck and Wood, 2003); tailored franchise subscription and tariff models to enable lower-cost 
service  or limited-mobility GSM coverage for rural areas (Dhawan et al., 2001; Engvall and 
  4Hesselmark, 2004) ; and wireless-local loop approaches (Caspary and O'Connor, 2003; Kibati and 
Krairit, 1999; McDowell and Lee, 2003).  Dymond and Oestmann (2002, 2003) argue that market 
liberalisation and intervention should be considered sequential rather than mutually exclusive.  
They distinguish between market efficiency, which can be achieved first through liberalization, 
and specific intervention to close the rural access gap that will persist without governmental 
mandates or incentives.     
3.  Public Policy and Cell Phone Diffusion in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Telephone connectivity remains low in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, but public policy has 
begun to address this problem.  Numerous governments, regional organizations, and private firms 
have identified the development of affordable “backbone”
3 infrastructure as a top priority for 
improving connectivity (Neto et al., 2005).  A recent World Bank review of telecommunications 
reform in 24 countries
4 finds widespread reforms that are intended to improve service quality 
through privatization and competition, supported by a stable regulatory environment (World Bank, 
2007).  Specific reforms include enactment of formal regulations, creation of national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs), privatization of incumbent operators, and introduction of competition.  
Establishment of NRAs has typically included measures focused on competition, licensing, 
interconnection, allocation of scarce resources (e.g., numbering and spectrum) and pricing.  Table 
2 summarizes the recent history of telecommunications reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
As these 24 countries have enacted reforms, competition has deepened and cell-phone 
networks have expanded steadily.  In 1993, three-quarters of the countries studied had no cell 
                                                 
3  The term “backbone” refers to the use of communications infrastructure to connect major switching centers, as 
opposed to last-mile connectivity. 
4 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.   
  5network and all existing networks were monopolies.  By 2000, all but one had at least one cell 
network and 14 allowed competition.  By 2006, all had cell networks and only three did not have 
competitive cell markets
5; 12 of the countries had two or more operators.  During the period 2000-
2006, total cell subscribers in the 24 countries increased from 10 million to 110 million.  The trend 
in regional subscription shares reflects the proliferation of cell networks.  While South Africa 
accounted for 81% of Sub-Saharan subscribers in 2000, its share dropped to 34% in 2006.  By 
2003, South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda had more cell 
subscribers than subscribers to fixed lines (Barnard and Vonk, 2003).   
4.  Determinants of Cell Phone Coverage 
4.1   The Basic Economics of Cell Tower Location 
Our analysis of coverage divides Sub-Saharan Africa into 2.5 arc-minutes (4.6 km at the 
equator), overlays those squares with cell-phone tower locations, and investigates the likelihood 
that each grid square contains at least one tower.  We posit a basic model of locational economics, 
in which the provision of cell-tower services depends on a set of market demand and supply 
variables.  Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of cell-tower installation will be greater for sites with 
higher potential demand and lower installation and maintenance costs.  The basic determinant of 
demand is the size of the population within the transmission radius of the tower.  On the supply 
side, we posit a set of cost factors that relate to the construction and maintenance of tower 
facilities: ease of access to material and service supply centers (distance from a main road, average 
travel time to the nearest city with 100,000 or more inhabitants); and topography (elevation, slope).  
                                                 
5  Namibia issued a second cell provider license in 2006 and the new operator was expected to launch in 2007.  In 
Cape Verde, there is no legal restriction against cell competition and efforts continue to license a second cell operator. 
This leaves Ethiopia as the only country where there is no process underway to liberalize the cell market. 
  6We also posit a significant role for the competitive environment.  In markets with limited 
competition, we would expect profit-maximizing firms to offer more limited services at higher 
prices.  The spatial reflection of this limitation, relative to more competitive environments, would 
be fewer cell phone towers, concentrated in areas with larger populations and lower installation 
and maintenance costs. 
4.2  Data 
To test the model, we use the best available spatially-disaggregated data sets from various 
public sources, including the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), the LandScan, 
the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), the Digital Chart of the 
World (DCW) and the World Bank.  The data on cell phone tower locations have been provided by 
the GSM Association in GIS polygon files for the period 1999: Q1 – 2006: Q3.  We overlay the 
data on a rectangular grid of evenly-space points, with a separation of 2.5 arc-minutes covering 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  This generates 1,138,835 points, which we plot in Figure 1.  Table 3 
summarizes our data sources; Table 4 provides basic descriptive statistics for model variables, 
which exhibit great variation across grid squares:  Elevations vary from sea level to 5,800 meters; 
slope steepness from 1.2 to 99.0; distance to a main road from 0 to 1,160 km; travel hours to a 
major city from 0 to 102; and proximate population from 0 to 578,000.  Our policy variable is an 
index of the competitive environment in 2004, provided by the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) database.  Globally, the CPIA competition index varies from 1 to 
6.  Among our sample countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it varies from 2.0 to 4.5, with a mean value 
of 3.2. 
Table 5 provides a quarterly time series of percentage land area covered by GSM cell towers.  
Overall, GSM service area coverage expanded from 2.7% in the first quarter of 1999 to 16.7% in 
  7the third quarter of 2006, with concurrent growth of population coverage from 9.1% to 54.5%. 
Among the 41 countries covered by our analysis, Gabon had the greatest percent increase in 
population coverage (80.1%) and Somalia had the least (0.1%).  Djibouti, Guinea and Guinea-
Bissau also had very small population coverage (below 5%).  Table 6 presents GSM area and 
population coverage by country for 2000 and 2006. 
5.  Spatial Econometric Analysis 
5.1  Specification 
We cannot perform panel data analysis because most of our explanatory variables are time-
invariant.  We therefore focus on explaining GSM service coverage in the third quarter of 2006, 
the latest period for which information is available.  We identify service coverage with a binary 
variable (GSM06q3) whose value is 1 if a grid square had cell phone coverage in 2006:Q3 and 0 
otherwise.    
Our coverage model relates the probability of service tower location in a grid square to its 
characteristics related to demand (population within transmission range) and supply cost 
(elevation, slope, distance to main road, travel time to nearest major city), as well as the 
competitive environment in the country.   
5.2  Estimation  
We estimate by probit for 993,401 grid cells, using logs of continuous variables with the 
exception of slope.  For the latter, we use an index whose value is 1 for steeply-sloped areas and 0 
otherwise.  We also use an interaction term to test the joint effect of potential service population 
and the competitive environment.  We present out basic probit estimates in Table 7, column 2. 
Probit estimation with data from continuous grid squares can be subject to significant spatial 
autocorrelation, which leads to inconsistent and inefficient estimates.  In order to correct for 
  8potential spatial error, we apply a Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation method using the Gibbs 
sampler.
6  Although our approach uses relatively sparse matrices, our ability to correct for spatial 
autocorrelation is limited by computer memory and operating system capacity
7  Our application 
(Windows 32-bit operating system, MatLab software) cannot handle matrices larger than 16,000 
square elements – far smaller than the 993,401 observation cells in our estimation dataset.  We 
adjust to this limit by switching from 2.5 arc-minutes to 50 arc-minutes (93 km at the equator).  
We classify the data in 400 groups, with the weights matrix counting points within 150-kilometers 
of a given point as neighbors.
8  For each of the 400 groups, we assume a burn-in of 500 iterations, 
and save the simulated parameters from the following 500 iterations.  This generates 200,000 
parameter sets (for the 400 groups), which we use to compute average coefficients and their 
standard errors.  We present these estimates in column 3 of Table 7. 
Since reduced t-statistics are generally expected in smaller datasets, we also employ a third 
variant to aid interpretation of our results.  We estimate a standard probit model for the same 
reduced data set of 400 groups, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods, 
without controlling for spatial autocorrelation.  Computed average coefficients and standard errors 
are presented in Table 7, column 4. 
                                                 
6 The Gibbs Sampler allows us to simulate a joint distribution of parameters by simulating each set of parameters, one 
set at a time, conditional on all other parameters. The special advantage of the Gibbs Sampler for use in spatial probit 
stems from the fact that it also simulates the continuous latent variable (Albert and Chib, 1993). See Thomas (2007) or 
LeSage (1999) for detailed discussion of the methodology. 
7  The parametric approach to spatial probit requires a weights matrix to quantify the relationship of each observation 
to the rest. Since only observations in geographic proximity generally have non-zero influence, it is reasonable to use 
sparse matrices for computation. 
8  In practice, this approach specifies horizontal, vertical, and diagonal points within 150 km as neighbors (assuming 
the points exist on land (neither in the ocean nor an inland body of water))..   
  95.2  Results 
Table 7, column 2 presents unadjusted probit estimates for the complete dataset of 993,401 
observations. The results are all consistent with our expectations:  The probability of a GSM cell 
tower location in a grid square increases significantly with population and the degree of 
competition, and decreases significantly with higher levels of installation and maintenance cost 
factors (higher elevation, steep slope, longer distance from the main road, longer travel time to the 
nearest major city).   
Column 3 of Table 7 presents results from our MCMC estimation that adjusts for spatial 
autocorrelation.  The large, significant spatial error estimate at the bottom of column 3 is consistent 
with significant spatial autocorrelation.  As expected, the reduced data sample and MCMC 
adjustment change the coefficient estimates and substantially reduce the t-statistics.  However, the 
signs and significance of the coefficients remain unchanged except for elevation, which retains the 
expected sign but loses significance.   
Table 7, column 4, reports unadjusted probit estimates for the 400 100-km grid cells.  These 
results are quite close to those in column 3, indicating that the differences in coefficients and t-
statistics between column 2 and columns 3-4 are primarily due to reduction in the number of 
observations rather than spatial error.  The small impact of the spatial error (despite its 
significance) may be due to a homoscedastic variance structure produced by our uniform weights 
matrix (Fleming, 2004; Anselin, 2002, Thomas, 2007).  
Map a presented in Fig 2 documents the probability of cell phone coverage predicted by the 
probit estimates from our full spatial dataset (Table 7, column 2).   
 
 
  106.  Policy Implications 
Our results indicate that competition policy orientation is a powerful determinant of cell-
phone coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa.  To assess the potential implications of further reform, we 
perform a policy simulation using the probit estimates from our full spatial dataset (Table 7, 
column 2).  For all 993,401 grid cells, using the observed values for our demand and supply 
variables, we simulate strongly pro-competitive policy by setting the CPIA index at 4.0 for all 
countries with CPIA index below 4.0.  While this would require substantial reform in many Sub-
Saharan countries, it has already been attained by Benin, Botswana, Namibia, Uganda and South 
Africa
9.  Our simulation increases the probability of cell-tower location in all grid squares that are 
in countries whose current CPIA scores are below 4.0.   Map b in Figure 2 plots the full results for 
Sub-Saharan Africa, showing the probability of cell-tower location in each grid square.  Higher-
probability squares are colored blue; lower-probability squares green.  The clustering pattern in the 
map reveals the critical roles of population, infrastructure and topography in determining coverage, 
even with uniformly-high levels of competition policy.   
Numerically, our policy simulation results translate to very large changes in area coverage 
for cell phone towers.  For the two cases (current CPIA, CPIA=4), Table 8 presents country-level 
percent differences in grid squares with cell-tower probabilities greater than 0.5.  These are 
equivalent to expected percent differences in area coverage by country.  For nine countries, the 
policy improvement translates to a coverage increase greater than 100%, and for all countries 
whose CPIA was below 4 in 2004, the predicted increase in coverage is 96%. 
 
 
                                                 
9 For these countries, actual CPIA values were used for the simulation. 
  117.  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we have identified and investigated a striking example of a digital divide within 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  Although almost all Sub-Saharan countries are poor by international 
standards, they exhibit great disparities in coverage by cell telephone systems.  We investigate the 
determinants of these disparities with a spatially-disaggregated model that employs locational 
information for cell-phone towers across over 990,000 4.6-km grid squares in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Using probit techniques, we estimate a probability model that relates the likelihood of cell-tower 
location within a grid square to potential market size (proximate population); installation and 
maintenance cost factors related to accessibility (elevation, slope, distance from a main road, 
distance from the nearest large city); and national competition policy.  We estimate a simple probit 
model, as well as a model that adjusts for spatial autocorrelation.  We obtain strong, significant 
results for the supply-demand variables, and very strong results for our competition policy index.  
Using the results, we simulate the effect of a generalized improvement in competition policy to a 
level that currently characterizes the best-performing states in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Our results 
indicate huge improvements in area coverage for many states with poor policy performance, and 
an overall coverage increase of nearly 100%.   
Our results provide striking evidence of the power of policy reform to improve public access 
to telecommunications in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Our policy reform results are particularly strong 
because they do not involve extrapolation from econometric estimation of reform impacts in other 
regions.  Basing our work on the experience of Sub-Saharan African alone, we find that simply 
improving competition policy to the current levels of superior performers in the region would 
generate huge telecommunications benefits for the populations of the affected countries.   
  12While these results are very hopeful, we feel compelled to close on one cautionary note.  
Inspection of the simulation map b in Figure 2 suggests that competition policy reform alone will 
not be sufficient to ensure universal coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa.  On the map, coverage is 
concentrated in areas with relatively dense populations, near main transport arteries.  The large 
swaths of brown and black reveal the extent of coverage exclusion for low-density rural 
populations that are off-road and uphill.  As many analysts cited in Section 2 have noted, targeted 
interventions in such areas may be necessary to close Africa’s digital divide completely. 
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  17Table 1:  Population Coverage by Country: Rural and Urban GSM Cell Phone Towers 
     March, 2004 
 
  % of Population Within Range of a GSM Cell Phone Tower
a,b 
Location  Minimum  Quartile 1  Median  Quartile 3  Maximum 
Rural 0.0  3.4 20.0 46.9 100.0 
Urban 0.0  56.2 89.1 97.9 100.0 
  
a Cell phone tower data source: GSM World, Inc. 
b Spatial population distribution data source: Gridded Population of the World, version 3 
       Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), 
       Earth Institute at Columbia University.   
 





Cape Verde  1994 




















South Africa  2006 
 
Source: World Bank (2007). 
  18Table 3: Summary of Data Sources 
 
Dimension Dataset   
Name 
Unit Resolution  Source(s) 
Elevation  SRTM30  Meters  30 arc seconds  CIAT  
Slope  LandScan 
1998 
Percent slope = 
100 * rise / run 
30 arc seconds  LandScan 
Distance to main 
road 
  Meters  1 kilometer  World Bank 
Hours to major city  UNEP  Hours 
(truncated) 
1 kilometer  World Bank 
Population GRUMP  Population 
counts 
30 arc seconds  CIESIN 
Index of Competitive 
Environment for the 
Private Sector  
CPIA-2004  1-6 scale  Country-level  World Bank 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (based on 993,401 observations)
10 
 
 Mean  sd  Minimum  Maximum 
GSM06q3   0.188 0.391  0  1.0 
Elevation (m)  699.2  478.2 0 5,778 
Slope (= 100 * 
rise / run)  1.247 3.062  0  99.0 
Distance to main 
road (m)  159,971 191,096  0.3  1,157,475 
Hours to major 
city   11.62  11.18 0 102.0 




index, 2004 (1-6 
scale) 
3.236 0.556  2.0  4.5 
 
 
























% of Land with 
GSM Service 
2.7 3.1 5.2 6.3 6.9 7.5 7.5 8.6 8.6  10.7  16.7 
 
                                                 
10 Central African Republic, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Niger were excluded from the analysis 
because GSM data for those countries were only available  for 2006, Q3.    












Angola 1,250,465 13,091,350 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 31.4%
Benin 116,377 6,297,060 0.0% 0.0% 6.1% 43.3%
Botswana 560,030 1,542,830 0.1% 0.3% 18.2% 66.7%
Burkina Faso 273,422 11,452,684 0.0% 0.0% 38.7% 60.3%
Burundi 25,505 6,403,703 0.0% 0.0% 49.6% 59.8%
Cameroon 463,813 14,787,480 0.0% 0.0% 17.6% 57.7%
Central African Republic 621,284 3,580,870 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 17.1%
Chad 1,244,997 7,901,687 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 23.5%
Congo 345,479 3,022,433 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 67.6%
Cote d'Ivoire 320,254 15,644,741 0.0% 0.0% 21.8% 57.4%
Dem. Rep. of Congo 2,312,898 50,835,211 0.0% 0.0% 20.1% 52.5%
Djibouti 20,568 521,998 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Equatorial Guinea 26,789 435,175 0.0% 0.0% 10.9% 37.1%
Eritrea 120,236 3,638,225 0.0% 0.0% 18.4% 50.1%
Ethiopia 1,123,309 62,907,122 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 10.1%
Gabon 260,932 1,202,513 0.0% 0.0% 21.6% 80.1%
Ghana 231,537 19,290,950 0.6% 18.3% 26.5% 62.7%
Guinea 245,572 8,059,264 0.0% 4.2% 0.1% 3.8%
Guinea-Bissau 32,633 1,160,795 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.3%
Kenya 571,726 30,546,856 0.0% 0.0% 32.1% 91.8%
Lesotho 30,502 2,024,104 1.3% 7.5% 33.8% 55.4%
Liberia 96,011 2,884,144 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 21.6%
Malawi 95,509 11,264,638 0.0% 0.0% 79.8% 93.1%
Mali 1,250,186 11,385,518 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 18.1%
Mozambique 774,844 18,017,410 0.6% 11.6% 10.0% 42.1%
Namibia 818,790 1,640,001 0.0% 0.0% 31.3% 73.6%
Niger 1,155,583 10,804,920 0.0% 0.0% 6.2% 43.6%
Nigeria 903,330 112,802,470 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 59.7%
Rwanda 24,202 7,645,897 0.0% 0.0% 73.2% 81.2%
Senegal 195,437 9,157,484 8.6% 57.6% 39.3% 82.3%
Sierra Leone 72,351 4,314,767 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 72.4%
Somalia 635,893 8,605,480 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
South Africa 1,218,199 43,157,036 49.8% 85.1% 86.0% 99.8%
Sudan 2,483,481 31,034,294 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 32.7%
Swaziland 17,112 916,045 0.7% 0.8% 89.3% 92.0%
Tanzania 889,235 34,792,931 0.0% 3.0% 19.1% 55.7%
The Gambia 10,661 1,242,343 0.0% 0.0% 34.0% 64.0%
Togo 57,349 4,493,843 0.0% 0.0% 41.1% 64.3%
Uganda 207,452 23,327,621 1.1% 10.0% 79.3% 96.9%
Zambia 745,896 10,497,219 0.5% 19.5% 9.7% 44.9%
Zimbabwe 388,192 12,602,282 2.1% 28.2% 29.8% 58.5%
% Covered
 
  20Table 7: Probit Estimates of GSM Coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2006
† 
 
 Non-Spatial  Probit 
(N=993,401) 






























































†Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. Marginal effects are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
  21Table 8:  Impact of Policy Reform (to CPIA = 4): 

















Burkina Faso  79.0 
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  23Figure 2:  Predicted Probability of Cell Phone Coverage  
Map a:  Prediction from probit 
 
Map b: prediction with World Bank CPIA competitiveness rating of at least 4.0 
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